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Abstract. The data transmission protocol, based on the use of a strongly correlated
pair of laser beams, is proposed. The properties of the corresponding states are
described in detail. The protocol is based on the strong correlation of photon numbers
in both beams in each measurement. The protocol stability against the interception
attempts is analyzed.
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1. Introduction.
The main goal of the quantum cryptography, which is the part of the quantum
computing, is in development of the reliable and secure procedures of generation and
transmission of a cryptographic key, which can be used for the encryption of the further
communication. In the last years, some progress was achieved in this area [1, 2, 3]
and protocols were developed on the basis of the quantum entanglement [5, 6] of weak
beams and the sigle [7, 8, 21] or four photon states [9], mostly by means of adjusting
and detecting their polarization angles [11].
Those methods were realized experimentally [6, 10], but still they are difficult for
implementation in particular because of the complexity of a few photon state preparation
and detection. If a bit is transferred by a one or a few photons, the detection of each
state requires numerous acts of measurements, this slows down the information flow.
This relates even to the most successful realizations [19, 20] and that’s why the new
ideas are still in need.
In this work we propose and examine the cryptographic method based on the
use of a correlated two-mode laser beam for a secure key generation and transmission
between two sites. Such and similar beams are actively experimentally studied last
time [12, 13, 14]. Therefore we examine in detail the properties of the states, which
describe the two-mode correlated laser beams, investigate the dependence of these
properties on the beam intensity, and analyze the possibility to use such beams in
§ To whom correspondence should be addressed (cvus@ukr.net)
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the data channels. Also we study the question of stability of such channels against the
elementary eavesdropping attacks.
2. The coherently correlated state
The two-mode coherently correlated state is the way we refer to the generalized coherent
state in the meaning by Perelomov [4]. Such states were studied by Arvind [15] and
others [16, 17, 18] as the pair-coherent states.
The two-mode coherently correlated state can be described by its presentation
through series by Fock states:
|λ〉 = 1√
I0 (2 |λ|)
∑ λn
n!
|nn〉 (1)
Here we use the designation |nn〉 = |n〉
1
⊗ |n〉
2
, where |n〉
1
and |n〉
2
stand for the
states of the 1st and 2nd modes accordingly, represented by their photon numbers.
The states (1) are not the eigenstates for each of the operators separately, but are
the eigenstates for the product of annihilation operators:
a1a2 |λ〉 = λ |λ〉 . (2)
Such states can also be obtained from the zero state:
|λ〉 = 1√
I0 (2 |λ|)
I0(λa
+
1 a
+
2 ) |0〉 (3)
Hereinafter we denote the two-mode coherently correlated states as the TMCC
states. In this work we assume that two laser beams, which are propagating
independently from each other, correspond to the two modes of the TMCC state. States
of beams are mutually correlated. (Surely, the TMCC state can also be represented in
another way, for example, as a beam consisting of two correlated polarizations)
An observable of such a pair of beams (for example, the vector-potential) is given
by the expression:
A = ϕ∗1(x, t)a
+
1 + ϕ1(x, t)a1 + ϕ
∗
2(x, t)a
+
2 + ϕ2(x, t)a2 (4)
This expression has explicit spatial dependence ϕ(x, t) and the quantum operators
a, a+.
Let’s compare the TMCC state to the usual, noncorrelated two-mode coherent state
|α〉 = |α1〉1 ⊗ |α2〉2. Each of the two modes of such state is given by an expression:
|αi〉 = e−
|α|2
2
∑ αni√
n!
|n〉, i = 1, 2 (5)
Such states are the eigenstates for the corresponding annihilation operators:
ai |αi〉 = αi |αi〉
Thus the mean value of the vector-potential (4) is
〈A〉 = ϕ1α1 + ϕ∗1α∗1 + ϕ2α2 + ϕ∗2α∗2 (6)
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and this is the show of the quasiclassical properties of the beam (5).
In the case of the TMCC state the mean value of any characteristic, which is linear
in field, turns to be equal to 0, because during the averaging by the 1st mode the
a1 converts |n, n〉 to |n− 1, n〉, which is orthogonal to all the present state terms, so
〈λi| ai |λi〉 = 0, that’s why
〈A〉 = 〈λ|A |λ〉 =
{
ϕ∗1(x, t) 〈λ| a+1 |λ〉+ ϕ1(x, t) 〈λ| a1 |λ〉+
ϕ∗2(x, t) 〈λ| a+2 |λ〉+ ϕ2(x, t) 〈λ| a2 |λ〉
= 0 (7)
and so the quasiclassical properties in their usual meaning are absent in this case. But
they become apparent in the spatial correlation function
γ(x, t; x′, t′) =
{ 〈A(x, t) ·A(x′, t′)〉 − 〈A(x, t)〉 · 〈A(x′, t′)〉
= 〈A(x, t) · A(x′, t′)〉 , (8)
which is non-zero because 〈A(x, t) · A(x′, t′)〉 contains mean values for the products of
quantum operators and some of them are non-zero.
〈A (x, t) · A (x′, t′)〉 =


ϕ∗1 (x, t)ϕ1 (x
′, t′) 〈λ| aˆ+1 aˆ1 |λ〉+
ϕ∗1 (x, t)ϕ
∗
2 (x
′, t′) 〈λ| aˆ+1 aˆ+2 |λ〉+
ϕ1 (x, t)ϕ
∗
1 (x
′, t′) 〈λ| aˆ1aˆ+1 |λ〉+
ϕ1 (x, t)ϕ2 (x
′, t′) 〈λ| aˆ1aˆ2 |λ〉+
ϕ∗2 (x, t)ϕ
∗
1 (x
′, t′) 〈λ| aˆ+2 aˆ+1 |λ〉+
ϕ∗2 (x, t)ϕ2 (x
′, t′) 〈λ| aˆ+2 aˆ2 |λ〉+
ϕ2 (x, t)ϕ1 (x
′, t′) 〈λ| aˆ2aˆ1 |λ〉+
ϕ2 (x, t)ϕ
∗
2 (x
′, t′) 〈λ| aˆ2aˆ+2 |λ〉
(9)
3. Communication via quantum channel
Let we have to establish a secure quantum channel between two parties (Figure 1). Alice
has the laser on her side, which produces two beams in the TMCC state. The optical
channel is organized in such a way, that Alice receives one of the modes, the first, for
example, i.e. ϕA ≡ ϕ1,ϕA(xA, t0) = 1 , and Bob receives another one, i.e. ϕB ≡ ϕ2
,ϕB(xB, t0) = 1 at any moment of measurement t0, where xAand xBare Alice’s and
Bob’s locations respectively. Accordingly, Alice cannot measure the Bob’s beam and
vice versa:ϕB(xA, t0) = 0, ϕA(xB, t0) = 0. At that the field is:
A = ϕ∗A(x, t)a
+
A + ϕA(x, t)aA + ϕ
∗
B(x, t)a
+
B + ϕB(x, t)aB (10)
The intensity of the radiation, registered by Alice is proportional to the mean of
the NA = a
+
AaA operator, which is the number of the photons in the 1
st mode and
it is similarly for Bob with NB = a
+
BaB . Thus the mean observable values, which
characterize the results of the measurements, taken by Alice and Bob, are
〈NA,B〉 = 〈λ| a+A,BaA,B |λ〉 =
|λ2| I1 (2 |λ|)
I0 (2 |λ|) (11)
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Figure 1. Quantum channel between two parties with a TMCC source
These values are squared in field, and thus their mean values don’t turn to zero.〈
N2A,B
〉
= 〈NANB〉 = 〈λ| a+AaAa+BaB |λ〉 = |λ|2 (12)
The measurements have the statistical uncertainty, caused by quantum fluctuations.
For each of the observers the uncertainty can be characterized by the corresponding
dispersion:
σ2A,B =
〈
N2A,B
〉
− 〈NA,B〉2 (13)
Taking into account (12), we get the following expression:
σ2A,B = |λ|2

1−
(
I1 (2 |λ|)
I0 (2 |λ|)
)2 (14)
The interdependence of the results of measurements taken by Alice and Bob can
by characterized by the correlation function:
gAB =< NANB > − < NA >< NB > (15)
It’s useful to describe the channel quality by the relative correlation, which is
ρAB =
< NANB > − < NA >< NB >
σAσB
(16)
The main feature of the TMCC state is that the value ρAB is exactly equal to 1,
while in the case of non-correlated beams we would get ρAB = 0. This means that the
measurements of the photon numbers, got by Alice and Bob, each with her/his own
detector, not only show the same mean values, but even have the same deflection from
the mean values.
The laser beam is the semi-classical radiation with well defined phase, but due to
the uncertainty principle for the number of photons and the phase of the radiation,
there is a large enough uncertainty in the photon numbers, this can be seen from the
dispersion expression (14). Thus one can observe the noise, which is similar to the shot
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noise in an electron tube. In the TMCC radiation the characteristics of such noise for
each of the modes are amazingly well correlated to each other. This fact enables the use
of such radiation for generation of a random code, which will be equally good received
by two mutually remote detectors.
4. The protocol
We propose the following scheme for the TMCC-based protocol. The laser is set up
to produce the constant mean number of photons during the session and both parties
know this number. At some moment Alice and Bob start the measurements. They
detect the number of photons at unit time by measuring the integrated intensity of the
corresponding incoming beam. If the number of photons for the specific unit time is
larger than the known expected mean (which is due to the shot noise), the next bit of
the generated code is considered to have the value “1”. If the measured number is less
than the expected mean, the next bit is considered to be equal to “0”. The procedure
is repeated until both, Alice and Bob, get enough bits for the cryptographic key. The
described protocol can be supplied with the procedures of the cryptographic control.
5. Eavesdropping
Since the proposed protocol uses the scheme, which differs from the well-known schemes,
based on the entangled states of weak beams, it’s useful to study it’s stability against
the listening-in. We don’t cover all possible eavesdropping attacks here, taking into
consideration only the basic listening-in as the preliminary demonstration of the TMCC-
channel security and protectability.
Let’s assume that some eavesdropping intruder (her name is Eve) tries to get the
key being transferred between Alice and Bob through the quantum channel. In order
to do this, Eve has to split and avert a part of the beam, which goes to Bob and detect
its intensity by installing a detector at her side (figure 2). The field amplitude of the
beam splits then in some p : q ratio and thus instead of the quantum mode we have to
use the superposition
A = ϕ∗A(x, t)a
+
A + ϕA(x, t)aA + ϕB(x, t)aB + ϕ
∗
B(x, t)a
+
B +
+ϕE(x, t)aE + ϕ
∗
E(x, t)a
+
E (17)
Obviously, ϕB(xB, t0) = 1,ϕE(xE , t0) = 1 and ϕE(xB , t0) = 0, ϕB(xE , t0) = 0,
ϕA(xE , t0) = 0. The 2
nd mode is decomposed on the basis, which consists of the modes
coming to Bob and Eve. In order to describe the properties of this beam, we add a
mode to the basis of Bob and Eve, which is orthogonal to ϕ2:
ϕ0 = −qϕB + pϕE (18)
Without the eavesdropping (and, thus, without the splitter), Eve receives only the
ϕ0 mode, in which the laser doesn’t radiate, i.e. ϕ0 = ϕE and ϕ2 = ϕB.
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Figure 2. Eavesdropping attack on a TMCC-based quantum channel
The following conversion of operators corresponds to this decomposition:
a2 = paB + qaE, (19)
a0 = −qaB + paE (20)
Thus
ϕ0a0 + ϕ2a2 = ϕBaB + ϕEaE , (21)
and similarly for the hermitian-conjugate operators.
These transformations change the state (3) to:
|λ〉 = 1√
I0 (2 |λ|)
I0(λa
+
A(pa
+
B + qa
+
E) |0〉 (22)
Mean observable values in this case are
〈NA〉 = 〈λ| a+AaA |λ〉 =
|λ|2 I1 (2 |λ|)
I0 (2 |λ|) , (23)
〈NB〉 = 〈λ| a+BaB |λ〉 = p2
|λ|2 I1 (2 |λ|)
I0 (2 |λ|) , (24)
〈NE〉 = 〈λ| a+EaE |λ〉 = (1− p2)
|λ|2 I1 (2 |λ|)
I0 (2 |λ|) , (25)
Besides we must take into account the mean values of combinations of these
operators:
〈NANB〉 = 〈λ| a+AaAa+BaB |λ〉 = p2 |λ|2 (26)
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〈NANE〉 = 〈λ| a+AaAa+EaE |λ〉 = (1− p2) |λ|2 (27)
and 〈
N2A
〉
= 〈λ| a+AaAa+AaA |λ〉 = |λ|2 (28)
〈
N2B
〉
= 〈λ| a+BaBa+BaB |λ〉 = p4 |λ|2 + p2(1− p2)
|λ|2 I1 (2 |λ|)
I0 (2 |λ|) (29)
〈
N2E
〉
= 〈λ| a+EaEa+EaE |λ〉 = (1− p2)2 |λ|2 + p2(1− p2)
|λ|2 I1 (2 |λ|)
I0 (2 |λ|) (30)
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Figure 3. Absolute Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve correlation dependence on the intensity
of beam λ and the extent of eavesdropping expressed as p = cosψ for the normalization
p2 + q2 = 1
With these values we can estimate how the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve correlations
depend on the activity of an eavesdropper, which is characterized by the parameter p
and on the intensity of the beam. The graphs for these dependencies are given for both,
absolute and relative, correlations in figure 3 and figure 4 respectively. One can see that
in the case of the weak intercept the results of the Bob’s measurements almost do not
change, but at that, if the mean number of photon for Eve in less than 1, she can’t
really distinguish between the 0 bit value and 1, thus the eavesdropping isn’t effective.
If it becomes effective, Bob experiences the same loses in the transmission quality, the
Alice-Bob correlation becomes significantly less than 1 and the channel gets destroyed.
This is caused by the fact that each photon, intercepted by Eve gets absorbed on her
detector and thus can’t be received by Bob.
6. Conclusions
Correlated coherent states of the two-mode laser beam (TMCC states) show interesting
properties, which can be used, in particular, for the tasks of the quantum communication
and cryptography.
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Figure 4. Relative Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve correlation dependence on the intensity
of beam λ and the extent p = cosψ of eavesdropping
On the one hand, each of the modes looks like a flow of the independent photons
rather then a coherent beam, since mean values of the operators, which are linear in
field, are equal to 0 for each mode separately.
On the other hand, the strong correlation between the results of measurements for
each of the modes takes place. This correlation shows itself in the fact that in each of
the modes numbers of photons are the same and even the shot noise shows itself equally
in the both modes. This enables the use of the TMCC state as the generator and
carrier of random keys. At that, any signficiant attempt of the information intercept
in any of the channels sharply reduces the correlation, leading to the destruction of the
channel and, as a consequence, to detection of an eavesdropping. Thus, the TMCC-
laser generates and transmits exactly the 2 copies of a random key. Unlike the single or
two-photon schemes, which require large numbers of transmission reiterations to obtain
the statistically significant results, the TMCC beam can be intensive enough to make
each single measurement statistically significant and thus to use single impulse for each
piece of information, and remain cryptographically steady. This allows to essentially
increase the effective data transfer rate and distance.
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